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ABSTRACT 
The evolving nature of conflict will require the U.S. military to conduct 
humanitarian operations more frequently and on a larger scale than ever before. 
Humanitarian operations require extensive civil-military interaction, and this thesis 
suggests that the U.S. military is not currently postured and prepared to handle the 
increasing humanitarian requirement. 
This thesis analyzes the interactions that took place between the military, the 
Department of State, and non-governmental organizations throughout three case studies: 
Operation Unified Assistance (Indonesia, 2004), Operation Unified Response (Haiti, 
2010), and Operation United Assistance (West Africa, 2014). Each case study is 
presented as an independent operation with its own observations and recommendations. 
The conclusion then identifies four significant generalized items—joint training, 
militaristic tendencies, integrated communications, and structural systems for 
collaboration—that challenged civil-military interaction at some point throughout each 
case. 
This thesis concludes that a dedicated unit designed to immediately respond and 
lead the United States Government’s humanitarian effort should be created including 
manpower and representation from each U.S. agency that plays a part in humanitarian 
operations. Legislation similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act should pave the way for 
increased interagency interaction and cooperation to prepare the United States for the 
increasing demand for humanitarian response capabilities.    
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With the evolving nature of conflict today, experts believe the world will call on 
the U.S. military to conduct humanitarian and other non-combat operations on a larger 
scale and more frequently in the future. Much of this effort will involve working closely 
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local populations, and political leaders. 
However, senior military leaders and national security scholars have expressed concern 
that the military’s capabilities to conduct these missions need improvement. Army 
General David Perkins recently spoke to Army students at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) about the new Army Operating Concept and this growing concern.1 In anticipation 
of future requirements that will be placed on the Army and the U.S. military as a whole, 
this thesis examines the question, “How can the U.S. military be more effective at 
interacting with civilian organizations in humanitarian response operations?”    
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
“We can’t kill our way to victory. … It requires teamwork and cooperation,” 
stated former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Admiral Michael Mullen.2 Historically, 
military victory has meant triumph in combat over an enemy. Today, however, military 
victory must be achieved in situations such as humanitarian assistance, disease control, or 
a natural disaster response, as well as on the traditional battlefield. Dominant global 
trends suggest that changing demographics, increasing food, water, and energy needs, 
climate change, natural and man-made biological developments, and destabilizing 
political groups all will continue to complicate global security and make triumph more 
complex. Many of these modern challenges require a fresh approach and a realization that 
they cannot be met with technology advancements and overwhelming force alone.  
 
                                                 
1 General David Perkins, “Army Operating Concept,” Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, December 9, 2014. 
2 Colonel Gregory Grimes, “Civil Affairs: Gathering the Reins,” Small Wars Journal, 2009, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/199-grimes.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/199-grimes.pdf. 
 2
As General David Perkins said at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the 
modernization of our military requires a balance recognizing technological limits and 
emphasizing greater human, cultural, and political interaction.3 Many conflicts in the 
future, requiring a humanitarian response from the military, will involve numerous 
organizations trying to come together to solve the same problem. In order to achieve 
victory in these cases, the U.S. military will have to interact with and rely on other 
entities including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local populations, and 
political figures. The success or failure of the military will depend greatly on its ability to 
cooperate and coordinate with groups that may have completely diverse points of view 
regarding the solution to the problem. It is not clear that the U.S. military is equipped to 
meet the ever-increasing demand for the human, cultural, and political interactions that it 
will face in humanitarian operations in the future. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Tactical Civil-Military Cooperation   
Many scholars have discussed the difficulties that military units and individuals 
have had when working with civilian personnel. Volker Franke, for example, states, “The 
nature of complex humanitarian relief, peacebuilding, and reconstruction missions 
increasingly forces military and civilian actors to operate in the same space at the same 
time, thereby challenging their ability to remain impartial, neutral, and independent.”4 
A significant problem noted in the literature on Civil-Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC) is the doctrinal differences that motivate the activities of civilian organizations 
versus military units. For example, Thomas R. Mockaitis provides multiple reasons why 
U.S. CIMIC forces struggled to be effective in peace operations in Kosovo. His first point 
is the U.S. over-emphasis on force protection. He relayed the opinion of a spokesperson 
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525–3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: 31 October 2014), 8; Perkins, “Army Operating Concept.” 
4 Volker Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” 
International Journal of Peace Studies 11, no. 2 (2006): 7–8, 
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf. 
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on site that the U.S. military acted like “force protection was the mission”5 rather than a 
component of the mission. The U.S. domestic political atmosphere deemed the loss of a 
soldier during a peace operation as unforgivable resulting in such stringent force 
protection measures.6 This made U.S. soldiers seem uptight and confrontational, which 
are not suitable characteristics for most peacekeeping missions. Mockaitis also reports 
that other entities on the ground “complained of GIs being brusque, rude, and, in many 
cases, outright abusive at checkpoints.” He details a senior international organization (IO) 
leader’s observation: “Even the way Americans carry their weapons intimidates people 
unnecessarily. While the British cradle their Armalites in a disarming manner that leaves 
them no less ready to respond, Americans carry rifles in the engarde position, treating 
every one they encounter as a potential threat.”7 Mockaitis argues that intimidation 
hinders good civil-military relationship building and that people prefer to be trusted to 
being threatened. If the military wants to keep soldiers out of harm, the information that 
comes from positive relations with the local community will provide more protection 
than a robust force protection program.8  
Many authors, including Mockaitis and Joelle Jenny, identify the size and 
discipline of the U.S. military as a strength, but argue that this strength often transforms 
into a weakness in humanitarian operations. Mockaitis details how the size of the U.S. 
forces proves to be effective in most situations by providing immense amounts of power 
with precision. The hierarchal structure required to manage something that big, however, 
is a disadvantage during CIMIC and peace operations. Mockaitis recounts that many non-
government organization (NGO) personnel found that utilizing the vast resources of the 
U.S. military was difficult because of the lengthy request and approval process required.9 
Humanitarian operations often require a quick turnaround for decision-making and 
                                                 
5 Thomas R. Mockaitis, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo,” 
Strategic Studies Institute (2004): 33–34, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB583.pdf. 





resource request procurement to take advantage of unanticipated opportunities to provide 
support. Jenny describes fundamentally different rationales that exist between military 
and humanitarian organization, which shed light on this dilemma: “While soldiers 
respond to clear lines of command, sets of rules and operational orders, aid workers are 
generally independent minded and retain considerable decision-making power at field 
level.”10 
Mockaitis’ final point identifies the lack of cultural awareness among the 
American soldiers. The United States, he argues, seems to have the mentality to get in, 
get the job done, and get out as quickly as possible, leaving little room or patience for 
building relationships. He believes that the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program is an 
underutilized resource that could improve U.S. CIMIC operations. Using FAOs to train 
and prepare soldiers with cultural information and sensitivity will be invaluable among 
soldiers who are traditionally among the least educated in foreign affairs and languages 
of the developed nations.11 Much of the problems just discussed reside at the individual 
or small unit level. Proper training adjustments and standard operation procedure revision 
can alleviate the tensions experienced in many cases. Even with the best-trained soldiers 
and units, however, problems at the organizational level may still exist whenever military 
and civilian entities must work side by side.  
2. Operational Civil-Military Cooperation 
The potential for military involvement in CIMIC to create security concerns for 
humanitarian organizations and NGOs has been understood and addressed since the early 
1990s, when the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began to advocate 
“humanitarian space,” a term that labels “the ability of humanitarian agencies to work 
independently and impartially without fear of attack in pursuit of the humanitarian 
imperative.”12 With this principle of impartiality, humanitarian agencies can operate 
                                                 
10 Joelle Jenny, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies: Finding Ways to Make It 
Work,” European Security 10 no. 2 (2001): 27, doi:10.1080/09662830108407492. 
11 Mockaitis, “CIMIC in Peace Operations: Kosovo,” 33–34. 
12 Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: CIMIC in Stability Operations,” 12. 
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among the local populations freely without political barriers constraining their work.13 
Since the presence of the military can complicate the political and security environment, 
it should only be involved in humanitarian operations “where people are dying, or at risk 
of dying, and only the military can save them.”14   
The military, however, has become accustomed to using assistance work as a 
means to win the hearts and minds of the locals. The military contends that the intent of 
the hearts-and-minds approach will result in enhanced force protection and information 
gathering; providing humanitarian assistance is only a means to an end. This practice has 
often had a negative effect of causing a misunderstanding among the locals regarding the 
role of humanitarian agencies and military forces. This situation has made it increasingly 
difficult for humanitarian groups to maintain the ability of being impartial, neutral, and 
independent.15 In order to avoid the potential downfalls of CIMIC, James V. Arbuckle 
suggests that the military could set up lines of communication and logistical support, 
provide medical services, establish command and control networks, and enhance 
protection.16 He continues to suggest that the military should not be a direct intervention 
tool in relief efforts, and cannot be an offensive force in a humanitarian operation.17  
Experts argue that in the humanitarian circumstances where the military must get 
involved, CIMIC can be more effective without negative side effects if there is a clear 
line of duties drawn between the actions of the military and the civilian agencies. This 
line should be drawn to utilize each entity’s strengths without encroaching on the blurry 
situations previously described. Drawing that line seems to be one of the more difficult 
tasks to accomplish in a humanitarian operation.  
Dr. Chris Seiple, a former NPS student, recognized these issues and compared 
four humanitarian interventions conducted by the U.S. military in his 1996 book, The 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: CIMIC in Stability Operations,” 12. 
15 Ibid. 




U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions.18 His work examined the 
operational interaction between NGOs and the U.S. military during four specific 
humanitarian interventions between 1991 and 1994: Operation Provide Comfort, 
Operation Sea Angel, Operation Restore Hope, and Operation Support Hope. Seiple 
chose these operations to analyze because the need that existed in each situation was 
greater than the capabilities of the local and international humanitarian response 
community could handle by themselves, thus forcing the U.S. military to get involved. 
Each operation demonstrates the level of preparedness that existed within the U.S. 
military to communicate and coordinate with its interagency and non-governmental 
partners.   
As we will see, the complexities and dimensions that exist, particularly between 
NGOs and the U.S. military, during modern humanitarian interventions have always 
existed. It may be impossible, therefore, to formulate a single comprehensive model that 
will provide a fail-safe preparatory program for conducting humanitarian operations. 
Seiple concluded that, “None of these cases will ever be repeated; none should be cast in 
bronze nor held up as holy writ.”19 
He attempted to discover similarities among those interventions that led to 
successful interaction. He also identified possible areas for improvement for future 
operations. Seiple’s conclusion suggests that NGO/Military coordination and 
collaboration should happen prior to the intervention. If it cannot happen before the 
intervention, it needs to take place at the immediate beginning as quickly as possible.20 
The NGOs need to have a system in place in the states or on mutual training grounds 
where they can become a regular part of the interagency planning process and create 
continuing dialogue. Unfortunately, a comprehensive response effort is fundamentally 
against the nature of many NGOs. Normally, non-profit organizations build their 
reputation—and funding—by showing current and potential donors “their work” they are 
                                                 
18 Chris Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, (The U.S. Army 
War College, 1996), https://globalengage.org/attachments/429_Seiple-%20The%20U.S.%20Military-
NGO%20Relationship%20in%20Humanitarian%20Interventions.pdf. 
19 Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, 193. 
20 Ibid., 200. 
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accomplishing around the world. A comprehensive response, however, becomes a 
necessity when the scope of a humanitarian response exceeds the capabilities of any one 
organization.21 
The context of the interagency dialogue, Seiple clarifies, is not as important as the 
actual existence of the dialogue. Each humanitarian response will be different, thus a pre-
intervention coordination plan of effort cannot always be thoroughly created, but, “the 
expression of how each community understands the others expectations and needs” is the 
essential byproduct of interagency dialogue.22 Organizations and agencies preparing for 
the eventual humanitarian response need to come together early and often to update one 
another on their respective capabilities, limits, and intentions, as well as to establish 
mutual definitions for terms such as “security” and “success.”23 
Seiple then moves to discuss the operational perspective to the political situation. 
He encourages the military and the NGOs, “to work together against a common enemy: a 
potentially inattentive stateside political apparatus.”24 While settling on mutual 
definitions of terms, the NGOs must take the lead on defining what “success” looks like. 
Long after the military departs, the NGOs will remain on scene for an indefinite amount 
of time. Each entity in a humanitarian operation must understand their role in a 
continuum of effort to achieve victory over the political enemy and find “success” in the 
humanitarian operation. The military and NGOs will each have their own particular set of 
tasks and missions within the operation. The NGO/military relationship at the operational 
level must be synergistic and united in acknowledging that the primary focus of effort 
must be toward achieving the mutual humanitarian goals.25 When all entities understand 
this concept, they will work together complimenting each other according to their 
comparative advantage. The military must avoid the political entanglement by 
succumbing to the NGOs’ definition of success and properly placing itself within the 
                                                 
21 Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, 200. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 200-1. 
24 Ibid., 200. 
25 Ibid., 201. 
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overall continuum. The military must understand that its end-state has one sole purpose: 
to effectively transition to the next phase of recovery and depart. Seiple states, “The 
military’s mission is to enable marginal self-sufficiency,” for the NGOs and eventually 
the local population.26  
For the military’s role in achieving the NGOs’ vision of success, Seiple lists three 
basic precepts. The first, which may be the most difficult for military leaders to grasp, is 
that the military cannot be in charge.27 The military must avoid placing itself in a position 
where the solutions to issues that arise are solved through their vast means. Multiple 
operational and political issues will occur if the military’s means are too involved in 
providing solutions. If any stage of the humanitarian effort relied on the military to 
continue, withdrawal will result in a vacuum of resources and the situation may quickly 
regress. Seiple states, “At all costs, the military must not provide solutions that inherently 
rely on military hardware and infrastructure.”28 
The second precept is the understanding that the military is there to help the 
NGOs, and not the other way around. The military is only there to help overcome specific 
hurdles along the humanitarian continuum. Understanding that the NGOs are the cultural 
and humanitarian experts who will remain on the ground until the very end will help 
prevent the military from instituting military infrastructure-based solutions.29  
The final precept suggests that the military’s operational focus of effort must be 
the CMOC.30 This center must remain an operations center and avoid being a simple hub 
for liaison officers. The NGOs and the military need a one-stop shop for decision-making 
and problem resolutions face to face. The military operations center must be in full 
support of the CMOC and not the other way around. The CMOC must be elevated to a 
high level of importance within the military culture. The best people need to work there, 
people with decision-making abilities and authority. Seiple also stresses that the transition 
                                                 
26 Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, 201. 
27 Ibid. 




process must be at the center of CMOC discussion. Planning and preparing for the 
transition and departure of the military must begin on day one inside the CMOC.31 
The last operational point Seiple shares is that the NGO/military relationship has 
more to do with people than institutions.32 The face-to-face coordination between a 
handful of people will always be more important and decisive in a humanitarian 
operation than all the education and information available.  
Seiple suggested that the NGO/military relationship was a fundamental trait 
during his time and in the future era of humanitarian operations. He suggested that, 
“interagency/multinational coordination will only increase, and … the role of civilians in 
military operations, no matter how pure the ‘battlefield,’ will also only increase.”33 Seiple 
predicted that the future would depend on a unity of effort between the military and 
NGOs, and the interaction between the two in inevitable. It is the responsibility of both 
communities to develop a unity of effort in understanding and developing this 
relationship on a continuous basis and preferable prior to reaching the field.  
3. Proposed Solutions 
Other experts, in addition to Seiple, have examined military and civilian 
humanitarian interaction for decades over numerous cases. Many lessons learned have 
been developed that echo and build on Seiple’s recommendations, while others offer their 
views from differing perspectives. The primary lessons uncovered by studies of previous 
humanitarian crises suggest that all entities need to communicate extensively and work 
together with respect and understanding for one another’s capabilities and strengths 
brought to any given operation. Some authors proclaim that for this to occur, CIMIC 
must be taken seriously from the beginning of any operation to avoid waste and casualties 
related to humanitarian responses. Early and thorough cooperation and training will 
ensure that the military and humanitarian assets are understood and fully utilized by each 
                                                 
31 Seiple, The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, 203. 
32 Ibid., 205. 
33 Ibid., 208. 
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other. Prior education and joint training for both the military and civilian organization 
will mitigate many of the issues that face the military’s involvement in CIMIC. 
Reinforcing the idea of mutual training grounds, Nick Spence suggests that NGOs 
and militaries conduct same-site training designed to identify and capitalize on their 
respective capacities.34 Together, the multiple actors will develop an agreed upon end 
state and then design a detailed plan, which will focus their talents on accomplishing the 
mission. Spence admits that a number of organizations, including military units, have 
already begun training in various CIMIC related activities, but he argues that until this 
training is available and a mandatory requirement for all participants in a CIMIC 
operation, operational success will continue to be difficult to accomplish. 35 Spence adds 
that training programs will also increase the mutual understanding of the ethos and values 
each organization holds. This understanding will in turn enable better collaboration and 
communication during training and actual operations.36  
Understanding the ethos and values of humanitarian organizations will help the 
military respect “humanitarian space” and its principles of impartiality and neutrality. 
Some authors also suggest that the path to more effective CIMIC lies in the 
understanding that the end-state of CIMIC goes beyond the actions and efforts of 
militaries and organizations on the ground. Arbuckle concludes that, “In a democracy, the 
military does not design policy—it executes it. A political and diplomatic failure to 
resolve these issues means that civilian and military workers must rise to these challenges 
on the streets and in the fields of conflicts.”37 In order to give CIMIC a hope at being 
effective, political and diplomatic leaders must do their part and raise their awareness of 
the challenges facing the military and the nation in the future. Franke writes, “In 
November 2005, recognizing the growing importance of peacebuilding missions, the U.S. 
Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05 elevating stability operations to ‘core 
                                                 
34 Nick Spence, “EYEWITNESS—Civil-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies: More than a 
Field Application,” International Peacekeeping 9, no. 1 (2002): 167, doi:10.1080/14002699.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Arbuckle, “Analysis: No Job for a Soldier?” 
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U.S. military missions’ and giving it ‘priority comparable to combat operations.’”38 This 
Directive is an important step but many believe it is not enough. As a democratic nation, 
the military must rely on the policymakers to give them the resources required to make 
CIMIC a success. The increasing numbers of stability operations around the world 
suggest the need for the military to incorporate stability operations extensively into 
planning and training exercises. Franke reiterates, “The directive specifies the need to 
identify stability operations capabilities and assess their development; develop stability 
operations joint doctrine in consultation with relevant U.S. departments and agencies, 
foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, NGOs, and 
members of the private sector.”39   
C. POTENTIAL HYPOTHESES 
One seemingly important factor in a successful humanitarian intervention is that 
thorough coordination and communication must exist between military and non-military 
actors. Francis Kofi Abiew writes that, “The intense field experience of the past few 
years has tended to reveal the fact that effectiveness of contemporary peace operations 
will depend on the collaboration of military and civilian actors.”40  
A civil military operations center or its equivalent has been used for militaries, 
civilian organizations, and government leaders to coordinate and facilitate humanitarian 
responses. The actions that take place at the CMOC or its equivalent have evolved over 
the past two decades, but have often proved insufficient. The next step in developing 
coordination efforts must happen prior to the humanitarian response. The military and 
non-governmental organizations are experts in their respective fields. Coming together to  
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support a humanitarian response, however, exposes differences in each of their trainings 
and preparations for anticipated operations. These differences create conflict and 
misunderstanding among the various entities participating in a response and result in a 
steep learning curve at the onset of an operation. The teams must use valuable time in the 
field and at the CMOC to learn each other’s operational cultures, strengths, and standard 
operating procedures before they can effectively synchronize efforts. Although this thesis 
will identify multiple “fixes” to the problem of making humanitarian response operations 
more effective, it will suggests a specific civil-military joint training and unit 
restructuring to accommodate CIMIC prior to and during an actual humanitarian 
operation. This thesis will also examine what communication and coordination systems 
are currently in place with recommendations on how to make them more efficient and 
effective.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis analyzes three humanitarian response operations that employed 
extensive CIMIC since the turn of the century. These three case studies are compared 
with each other to determine successes and failures associated with the interaction that 
existed between the U.S. military and NGOs involved in each operation. These primary 
cases are also compared with the four case studies from the early 1990s used by Dr. 
Seiple to determine any useful similarities or identify significant CIMIC developments 
over the past 25 years.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis includes five chapters. Following the introduction, chapters II, III, and 
IV, examine three U.S. military humanitarian operations that have occurred since 1996: 
“Operation Unified Assistance” (Indonesia), “Operation Unified Response” (Haiti), and 
“Operation United Assistance” (West Africa). Chapter V looks at Seiple’s findings and 
identifies the progress made in CIMIC, particularly after 1996, and then offers 
suggestions on the way forward.  
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By introducing the general observations and suggestions in the field in addition to 
Seiple’s findings, this thesis begins with a solid baseline for post-cold war humanitarian 
interventions. As this thesis compares the modern cases of chapters II, III, and IV against 
Seiple’s and other’s findings, it shows progress, changes, repeated mistakes, and repeated 
successes over the past 25 years, which will help U.S. Military, U.S. Government, and 
NGO leaders design more effective humanitarian operational procedures and strategies 















II. OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE 
An earthquake registering 9.1 on the Richter scale occurred on the Indian Ocean 
floor near the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, on 26 December 2004. The earthquake 
created a massive tsunami that rippled outward toward the entire Indian Ocean rim. India, 
Sir Lanka, Thailand, and Indonesia suffered the most damage from the giant wave; 
however, the effects of the tsunami were felt in Africa nearly 3000 miles away. The 
destruction resulted in nearly 230,000 deaths and an additional 2 million left without 
necessities and shelter.41 Indonesia suffered the most devastation, and became the 
epicenter of a global humanitarian response. Additional areas of increased focus existed 
in Sir Lanka and Thailand. The United States Pacific Command (PACOM) responded 
with the initiation of Operation Unified Assistance (OUA) to provide assistance and 
lifesaving support to the effected populations.42 Many countries including Russia, France, 
Malaysia, Australia, Singapore, and others joined the response along with hundreds of 
International government and non-government organizations to form Combined Support 
Force 536 (CSF-536).43 
Following the sudden and immense destruction caused by the earthquake and 
resulting tsunami, thousands of personnel converged in the area representing hundreds of 
organizations to provide relief and ease the suffering. The nature of the situation in the 
region immediately following the aftermath of the sudden onset disaster required that an 
effective structure of communication and coordination be set up as quickly as possible to 
handle the large impending influx of response personnel across multiple affected 
countries. The complexities and capabilities required to manage the communication and 
coordination necessary fell on the only organization at the time capable of doing so, the 
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U.S. military.44 This chapter will review the humanitarian interaction and subsequent 
lessons learned during Operation Unified Assistance by the Department of Defense, the 
State Department, and International and Non-Governmental Organizations.  
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE 
The PACOM Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian 
Assistance set up a dedicated mission command center at its Hawaii headquarters to lead 
the strategic civil-military coordination efforts. PACOM also responded operationally by 
setting up Joint Task Force (JTF)-536 in Utapao, Thailand, using units from its Okinawa 
based 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF).45 Following an initial assessment of the 
resources and capabilities the response would require, PACOM realized that their 
response would need to increase dramatically. The Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary 
Strike Group and the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group received orders to proceed 
directly to the disaster area. In addition to the support by sea, PACOM deployed over 100 
aircraft to provide land-based transportation for response commodities and personnel and 
to conduct reconnaissance flights to assess and map the areas of destruction.46  
Two Disaster Relief Assessment Teams (DRATs) arrived in the area on 29 
December to evaluate the hardest hit areas in Sir Lanka and Thailand. The following day, 
a DRAT team arrived in Indonesia to conduct damage assessments there.47 The DRATs 
with help from multiple Navy P-3 surveillance aircraft were able to assess the extent of 
the damage and submit formal requests for assistance.48 The assessment teams then 
transitioned to a support and coordination function, and they began coordinating with the 
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governments and militaries of the affected countries. As additional team members and 
organizations arrived to support, the DRATs formed Combined Support Groups (CSGs) 
to conduct formal communication and coordination within their respective geographical 
areas.49  
The Combined Coordination Center (CCC) began operations in Thailand on 2 
January 2005 shortly after III MEF commander Lt Gen Robert Blackman arrived on 
scene and took command of JTF-536.50 The CCC, located at the JTF HQ, served as the 
relief effort’s primary coordination center and oversaw the activities of the CSGs. The 
JTF grew substantially in the early hours of its existence to the extent that it was renamed 
the Combined Support Force (CSF)-536 to illustrate and recognize the diversity of 
entities represented in the overall effort.51 Although led by a U.S. commander, CSF-536 
consisted of members from eleven foreign militaries and multiple representatives from 
various U.S. Country Teams and UN agencies.52  
The U.S. military provided leadership and infrastructure at the operational level in 
the disaster response operations, but also provided significant tactical level support at the 
hardest hit areas throughout the region. The USS Abraham Lincoln acted as a forward 
operating sea base off the Coast of Sumatra Island, which was at the core of the relief 
effort.53 The damaged infrastructure of the area could not support the intentions and 
objectives of many NGOs trying to reach those affected the worst. United States military 
helicopters transported NGO personnel and supplies to the hard-to-reach areas while the 
Lincoln served as a hosting and coordinating center for NGO and transportation 
representatives.54  
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At the peak of operations, the U.S. military response effort included 26 ships, 
over 100 aircraft and 16,000 U.S. military personnel. Estimates suggest that the U.S. 
military provided nearly half a million gallons of fresh water and transported 10 million 
pounds of food and supplies.55 The CSGs in Thailand and Sir Lanka completed their 
operations by the end of January, and the CSG in Indonesia ended operations on 10 
February.56 The CSF continued to coordinate the transition until 24 February, which 
officially marked the end of U.S. military involvement in the response.57  
B. STATE DEPARTMENT AND INTERAGENCY RESPONSE 
The initial planning and coordination that took place within the U.S. government 
began amongst senior agency personnel, overseen by the National Security Council. The 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) immediately tasked its 
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) to send multiple Disaster Assistance 
Response Teams (DARTs) to the affected countries and conduct health, sanitation, and 
housing assessments. In Washington, OFDA also began operating a 24-hour response 
center to begin coordinating the USG relief efforts, as well as receive the reports coming 
in from the DARTs on scene.58 The OFDA also sent a liaison effort to Hawaii to assist in 
civil-military coordination at the PACOM mission center.59 
The United States and the American ambassadors responsible for the countries in 
the affected area immediately recognized the extensiveness of the disaster and pledged 
financial support. Initial contributions included $400,000 by the ambassadors and an 
additional $4 million from the U.S. government in support of the Red Cross.60 The  
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funding committed to the response by the United States increased substantially following 
the DARTs’ dire assessments. Estimates suggest that by the end of the humanitarian 
mission, the United States committed over $908 million in aid and reconstruction 
funding.61  
Following the initial assessments, the USG immediately pushed emergency relief 
supplies from strategic military and civilian caches to the affected region. The senior 
USG representatives then reached out to the multitude of entities involved including the 
UN, host nation agencies, and other major players to begin immediate communication 
and coordination efforts.62 Together with the UN, the OFDA helped establish a local 
Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) in Banda Aceh to serve as the center of 
interagency coordination.63    
C. INTERNATIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 
RESPONSE 
The international community played a significant role in 2004 Indonesian tsunami 
response. Hundreds of NGOs expressed a willingness to participate in the life-saving and 
recovery efforts throughout the affected region.64 But, the international response was so 
extensive that coordination and communication between all the actors was difficult.  
The United Nations assumed official responsibility for coordinating the activities 
of the international community, but found difficulty being effective due to the multitude 
of UN agencies overlapping in the area. Carsten Volz noted that at one point there were 
“72 coordination meetings per week in Banda Aceh alone.”65 Since many of the smaller 
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NGOs did not have the resources or personnel to attend the numerous meetings, their 
absence further amplified the coordination problem. Recognizing the difficulty in 
disseminating all the necessary information, the UN organized a Humanitarian 
Information Center (HIC) to gather and organize information so humanitarian agencies 
could stay better informed.66  
The internal coordination within the NGO community struggled as well to be 
efficient and effective. Initially, the larger NGOs tried to hold weekly informal meetings 
to improve collaboration. Eventually, CARE, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and The 
International Council of Voluntary Agencies formalized the NGO coordination 
meetings.67       
D. OBSERVATIONS 
Reaching out to the numerous NGOs spread across the region was a difficult task 
for every coordination center. The UN’s IASC saw its efforts to coordinate the effort 
challenged along with the U.S. military in its CCC. PACOM officials report that only a 
handful of NGO representatives participated in their coordination meetings between 
themselves, UN agencies, U.S. Country Teams, and others.68 The UN’s IASC did not 
have any formal authority over any other response entities; therefore, the attendance at its 
coordination meetings was voluntary, and sparsely attended.69  
In an effort to reach more relief personnel, the U.S. military quickly realized that 
its use of unique communication systems and the SIPR-net was counterproductive. The 
exclusive use of an unclassified compatible network was necessary. The Asia-Pacific 
Area Network (APAN), was the best available system for communication between 
militaries, government agencies, and civilians. APAN is a website developed and funded  
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by PACOM to promote communication and collaboration regarding security issues in the 
Asia-Pacific Area. The network, however, was not perfect and many still experienced 
problems using it.70  
Additional gaps that existed between the military and NGOs included political 
perceptions and impartiality. The reluctance of NGOs to work with the U.S. military and 
other military entities for fear of losing their concept of impartiality is a coordination 
issue that exists in nearly every major humanitarian response.   
Along with the reluctance to work with militaries, the small number of NGOs 
present in Indonesia prior to the tsunami delayed both civilian and military assessment 
capabilities early in the disaster response. There was a general lack of adequate and 
timely assessments early in the relief process. Further compounding the assessment 
problem, the military and NGOs were reluctant to share what little assessment 
information they had gathered with each other, often resulting in duplicative 
assessments.71 
Due to either personal ambitions or the lack of coordination systems in place 
some NGOs after making their individual assessments acted without prior coordination, 
and began delivering aid to locations and people already supported.72 These actions 
further complicated an already crowded relief effort making the situation on the ground 
more chaotic. In any relief effort, physical space for relief supplies is limited and 
valuable. Unorganized arrival and delivery of commodities will delay essential logistical 
functions and impede the rapid response required.73    
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E. THE WAY FORWARD 
This case suggests that early efforts to consolidate coordination between the U.S. 
military, USG, UN, NGOs, and the host nations are essential for rapid and efficient 
disaster relief efforts.74 All parties being able to access a compatible communication 
network is the first step in streamlining coordination efforts. In order to communicate in a 
digital world, all parties must have access to the same virtual networks.75 The multiple 
layers of UN coordination efforts and the resultant delays could have been minimized if 
the U.S. military and the entire international response operated on a universal and 
unclassified communications network. Developing a network capable of secure and 
reliable communication across all parties continues to be an unsolved issue. Until 
resolved, the most humanitarian leaders can do to minimize this hurdle is understand the 
limits of existing networks and anticipate the challenges and associated workarounds 
from the beginning.   
Robert Loughran suggests that the PACOM commander of the OUA serves as a 
model for future missions by demonstrating a positive humanitarian military leadership 
characteristic by emphasizing and maintaining a supporting role to USAID in the 
response.76 Maintaining a supporting role is required to ensure a smooth and quick 
transition and exit of U.S. military forces. From the very beginning, U.S. forces must 
focus on building the capacities and abilities of the host nation agencies and NGOs. The 
mission must revolve around an effort to reach self-sustainment as quickly as possible to 
avoid a large-scale military dependency.77 In the end, both military and civilian 
humanitarian agencies must accept that they are not there to run the response effort. 
International agencies respond to assist local and national communities in reestablishing 
their own capacity for self-sufficiency.78 Neil Joyce, writing for the Journal of AMSUS, 
argued, “Aid can backfire, create dependency, and cause additional hardship if aid 
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agencies insist on bringing their goods, their equipment, their programs, and their 
expertise, rather than promoting local capacity, leadership, and resources.”79 One of the 
lessons from this case is that right from the beginning of any humanitarian response, 
leaders from all parties must be planning for a successful transition from a largely 
military led early stage, to a civilian led end game. 
This case has also shown that military leaders should have a general awareness 
while working with NGOs that there will be a different experience in each situation. 
NGOs are not all the same and each has its own respective established principles and 
ethics regarding issues such as communicating and working with military organizations. 
Understanding these principles, along with the various capabilities, resources, and 
objectives of NGOs will help military leaders anticipate coordination challenges that will 
exist.80 Commanders must also understand the civil-military cooperation works both 
ways. While the missions of the military and civilians will usually differ, both can benefit 
from each other to accomplish their respective objectives. For example, military 
capabilities can grant access for civilians to remote populations in distress and provide 
security. Conversely, civilians can help legitimize military efforts among local 
populations and provide a quicker exit strategy previously discussed.81 Neil Joyce 
proclaims, “Despite cross-cultural issues and competition for recognition, there can be 
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III. OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE 
On January 12, 2010, Haiti experienced an earthquake that ranks among the 
deadliest in history. Measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale, the 2010 Earthquake killed over 
230,000 and left an additional 300,000 injured. It destroyed or damaged nearly 300,000 
structures, including 14 of 16 government ministry buildings and the presidential 
palace.83 The destruction that occurred within a few minutes left the capital city and parts 
of the country in ruins. The surviving Government of Haiti (GoH) officials had limited 
resources and capabilities to deal with the devastation. They made an immediate request 
for U.S. and international assistance. The United States responded, which resulted in one 
of the longest and largest foreign disaster relief operations the U.S. military has ever been 
a part of.  
The response package directed by President Barack Obama included a “whole-of-
government” response with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
the lead.84 U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) led the military’s mission in the 
response. SOUTHCOM deputy commander LTG P.K. Keen was already on the ground in 
Haiti visiting the U.S. Ambassador during the earthquake and established Joint Task 
Force-Haiti (JTF-H) within two days, immediately assuming responsibility for all U.S. 
forces in support of Operation Unified Response. The operation provided humanitarian 
assistance (HR) and disaster relief (DR) until JTF-H concluded operations on June 1, 
2010.85  
The appropriate and effective communication and coordination between the U.S. 
military, U.S. Government agencies, and the hundreds of non-governmental 
organizations were essential to the effectiveness of the mission. Necessary for a unity of 
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effort among the major entities in the response, all the supporting organizations needed to 
share a humanitarian common operational picture and synchronize their individual 
humanitarian assistance efforts. Communicating and coordinating across a nation 
devastated by an earthquake is a complex and difficult task requiring each major entity to 
play a particular role in the interaction necessary in Haiti. This chapter will review the 
humanitarian interaction and subsequent lessons learned during Operation Unified 
Response by the Department of Defense, the State Department, and International and 
Non-Governmental Organizations. 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE 
Militaries and organizations from around the world responded to ease the 
suffering taking place in Haiti following the deadly 2010 earthquake. The United States 
was only one of many countries—including the UK, Canada, Brazil, the Dominican 
Republic, Cuba and others86—that contributed to the cause, and the DOD was only a 
single aspect of the U.S. response effort. The U.S. military, however, provided the largest 
contribution of personnel and capabilities in support of the Haitian people.87  
Operation Unified Response officially started on January 14, 2010, but within 
hours following the earthquake, the U.S. military had already received orders and began 
necessary preparations and movement to support. Since the onset of the crisis was so 
sudden and the magnitude so intense, DOD did not undergo the formal process88 of 
assessing the situation with a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST). The JTF-H 
commander made the initial assessment based on his own experience and intuition and 
immediately  requested the use of the U.S. Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps’ assault 
command post (ACP).89 He also directed the Air Force Special Operations Command 
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(AFSOC) 1 Special Operations Wing (SOW) to send a Special Tactics Squadron (STS) to 
reestablish flight operations at the heavily damaged Toussaint Louverture International 
Airport.  
Prior to the operation officially beginning, the DOD had already ordered multiple 
U.S. Navy ships and the U.S. Army’s Global Response Force (GRF) to support the 
response. The joint force headquarters (JFHQ) was established on 13 January  2010 and 
started receiving units within 48 hours after the earthquake. The U.S. military response 
ultimately consisted of over 22,000 service members, 58 aircraft, and 23 vessels.90  
Joint Task Force-Haiti organized its Humanitarian Assistance Coordination 
Center (HACC) to streamline coordination between itself and the countless multinational, 
intergovernmental, and NGO partners. The name HACC can be misleading as the 
members of the center did not all work in the same place. Many of the HACC members 
interacted directly with the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) at the 
U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince to conduct coordination and liaison activities with many 
of the U.S. governmental agencies involved. The rest of the HACC personnel coordinated 
efforts with the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and other international organizations at the 
UN Logistics Base. At the UN Logistics Base, HACC members served as one of many 
entities that formed the UN cluster system.91 The HACC located at the UN Logistics 
Base was integrated with the Joint Operations and Tasking Center (JOTC), which served 
as the hub for logistical support requests by various humanitarian organizations.92    
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B. STATE DEPARTMENT AND INTERAGENCY RESPONSE 
After President Obama pledged full support to the Haitian government, he 
designated USAID as the lead federal agency to handle the U.S. response. The Office of 
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) within USAID began operating a response 
management team (RMT) in Washington to direct political coordination. It then 
designated a disaster assistance response team (DART) to begin coordinating the 
response from within Haiti.93 Due to the size of the U.S. response and the number of 
government agencies involved, an interagency task force in Washington and a new 
USAID Office of the Response Coordinator (ORC) in Haiti were set up to handle the 
multitude of U.S. governmental entities involved.94 Secretary of State Hilary Clinton 
appointed counselor and chief of staff Cheryl Mills to lead the overall effort due to her 
continued work on a Haitian development strategy. Her first action was to establish an 
emergency operations center and multiple task forces to coordinate with other U.S. 
agencies and international organizations.95 Many U.S. government agencies that would 
not normally be involved in a foreign disaster response played significant roles in the 
humanitarian effort. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Coast 
Guard (USCG), and FEMA along with others all supported the mission. FEMA 
established a National Response Coordination Center (NRCC)—a center normally 
reserved for domestic coordination—to assist the USAID administrator in leading the 
Interagency Task Force.96  
C. INTERNATIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 
RESPONSE 
The international contribution to the Haiti earthquake disaster response included 
more participants and funds than any historical response to a natural disaster. Many 
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NGOs were already in Haiti prior to the earthquake in support of the desolate state, but 
the number of organizations in Haiti grew substantially following the earthquake. The 
UN cluster system struggled to manage and coordinate with all the NGOs. Several lead 
NGOs, including InterAction and International Council of Voluntary Agencies, 
established a NGO coordination support office to try to enhance coordination and 
effectiveness.97 Estimates suggest that more than 140 countries and between 500 and 
2000 NGOs contributed to the relief effort in Haiti.98  
D. OBSERVATIONS 
With so many actors in the area, the humanitarian response quickly became 
congested and confusing. A key determining factor of success in a disaster response is 
how well all the players communicate with one another. Communication in a disaster 
response will operate more efficiently if the players already have established 
relationships prior to meeting in the field. Fortunately, the international community had 
been present for multiple decades helping and supporting the impoverished people of 
Haiti, thus many functioning relationships between the United States, the UN, and the 
government of Haiti already existed.99  
At the UN Logistics Base, the MINUSTAH Joint Operations and Tasking Center 
(JOTC) became the central location for routing requests from NGOs for military 
assistance. As a request came in, if MINUSTAH could not handle it, the U.S. military or 
other organizations could volunteer to assist. If the U.S. military volunteered to assist, 
USAID would upload the request into a Mission Tasking Matrix (MITAM) and send it to 
JTF-H for processing and execution.100 SOUTHCOM kept the flow of information 
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regarding requests for military assistance at the unclassified level as much as possible to 
encourage information sharing and transparency.101 Keeping information at the 
unclassified level contributed to JTF-H’s successful communication and coordination 
with NGOs and other players in the response.102  
The RAND Organization noted that the MINUSTAH JOTC model worked well in 
Haiti, but it is unsure if the same model will work as well in other disaster responses.103 
Multitudes of U.S. agencies, international relief organizations, and SOUTHCOM 
personnel were already in Haiti prior to the earthquake. The relationships and cultural 
understandings needed to quickly throw together an ad hoc response already existed in 
Haiti. Determining whether the JOTC model will work in all, or at least other, 
circumstances will require further evaluation and testing.  
At the soldier and small unit level, some humanitarian workers noted that the JTF-
H personnel seemed to be more prepared to interact with civilian agencies and local 
populations in Haiti than in disaster response efforts in the past. The soldiers seemed to 
relate well with other agencies and organizations, and they were more open and 
cooperative than previous humanitarian operations with civilians.104 Absent of any hard 
evidence, many civilian personnel suggested that the experience gained from the Iraq and 
Afghanistan campaigns prepared service members to interact and work with the various 
actors in Haiti.105  
E. THE WAY FORWARD 
Incredible amounts of resources, personnel, and money went into the 
humanitarian response effort in Haiti. With the sheer size of the response on a small-
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impoverished island nation, one should think that “building back better”106 would be an 
easily attainable goal. Many argue, however, Haiti is a long way off from being better 
than before the crisis. Multiple international organization still in Haiti report that many 
issues still exist, and they express concern regarding just what the $13.5 billion response 
effort really accomplished.107 Vijaya Ramachandran from the Center for Global 
Development suggests that part of the problem is the lack of accountability for relief 
organizations. She also observes the lack of communication between the government of 
Haiti and the numerous relief organizations. She said, “Right now what we’ve got is a 
process dominated by donors and NGOs. The government is almost a bystander.”108 
Other contributors to a Humanosphere article suggested that the problem developed in the 
beginning when the major players in the post-earthquake response failed to empower the 
government of Haiti.109 As many issues continue in Haiti even today, this chapter is most 
interested in where did the international response—particularly the U.S. military’s 
interaction with others—go wrong, and how could it have been more effective? 
Regardless of the situation in Haiti today, the U.S. military played a significant 
role in the Haitian earthquake disaster response that likely eased suffering and saved 
numerous lives. There are a few ways, however, that the U.S. military could have 
interacted with government and non-governmental organizations better. These include 
making a more accurate and joint initial assessment of the crisis, creating a more robust 
framework for communication and integration, and preparing unit leaders for 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief work.  
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The initial phase of the relief effort was massive, quick, and relatively 
unorganized.110 LTG Keen and the U.S. military led this surge because no other 
organization or agency existed that could handle such a response. The military itself was 
not fully prepared to manage the planning, coordinating, and tracking requirements 
present, which resulted in multiple logistical shortfalls. The inability of the U.S. military 
to conduct a formal assessment of the destruction made it impossible to determine what 
was needed and where. The lack of a formal assessment prevented JTF-Haiti’s from 
developing objective standards to compare its progress against. The informal assessment 
also caught the JTF by surprise when loads of unnecessary provisions were shipped in 
without adequate space to store and prepare the goods for distribution.111 The military’s 
logistical system at the time was designed for internal support, which made receiving and 
coordinating the massive external influx of personnel, equipment, and supplies 
difficult.112 One possible solution to ease the burden placed on the initial logistical system 
is to train and deploy an early-entry team to conduct joint assessments and determine 
requirements.113 With an accurate assessment, leaders can make the appropriate requests 
for supplies and personnel and avoid have too much of one commodity and not enough of 
another.   
There have been many suggestions since the earthquake in Haiti and other natural 
disasters about how the United States and its military could improve the communication 
and coordination nightmare that exists in almost every major natural disaster requiring a 
robust humanitarian response. The RAND organization suggests the development of a 
national framework to guide and document a foreign humanitarian response.114 A major 
concern among the leaders involved in Operation Unified Response was the disconnect 
and misunderstandings regarding the roles and responsibilities of each agency or 
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organization.115 A national framework or training program for foreign humanitarian 
efforts could become the center for planning, training, and conducting exercises aimed at 
identifying capabilities and assigning responsibilities for future humanitarian 
operations.116 As a gathering place for government, non-government, and military 
entities, a national framework would also foster relationship building and networking 
prior to arriving on scene immediately after a disaster strikes.117  
Exercises operated by the national framework could test various models from the 
past under different conditions to see if the model will work elsewhere. RAND suggested 
that the MINUSTAH JOTC seemed to work sufficiently in Haiti, but it would need to be 
tested and analyzed before it becomes a model of choice for future disaster response 
coordination.118 The exercises at the national framework could verify the effectiveness of 
the JOTC model or explore variations to make it work in other situations. 
 A national framework for foreign disaster response could also become the center 
for a standing organization designed to streamline and bolster humanitarian and disaster 
response activities. A standing organization could serve multiple important functions 
such as developing doctrine for response activities; serving as the administrative body for 
planning, training, model testing; and conducting joint exercises.119 During an actual 
incident, the organization would become the center of expertise, staff augmentation, 
logistical coordination, and collaboration for all the players involved in the response 
effort. 120 
Finally, at the individual and small unit level, the case of the Haiti earthquake 
suggests that leaders must enter a humanitarian response prepared for what they might 
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experience. The DOD has published multiple resources for commanders and unit 
representatives to educate themselves and their soldiers on humanitarian operations. The 
DOD also published a handbook for JTF Commanders and below in 2011 to explain the 
roles and responsibilities of the State Department, the U.S. military, and NGOs.121 It also 
lays out the disaster response process, and it gives guidance to military leaders in 
communicating and coordinating with foreign military and civil entities as well as NGOs. 
As small unit military leaders receive orders to conduct humanitarian operations, a prior 
familiarization to the principles and guidance in the commanders handbook will increase 
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IV. OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE 
Early in December 2013, a Guinean boy died from an illness caused by a virus. 
The virus quickly spread through the porous borders of Sierra Leone and Liberia. In 
March 2014, researchers and doctors in the area declared that the virus was Ebola. The 
virus continued to spread and doctors began diagnosing individuals with Ebola 
throughout all of Western Africa by September 2014.122  
The U.S. public’s anxieties grew in the face of the Ebola threat, and President 
Barack Obama declared the spread of Ebola as a threat to U.S. national interests on 16 
September 2014.123 Health officials worldwide could not deny that intervention was 
required to reverse the tide of outbreaks and to bolster the response capabilities of the 
Western African nations. President Obama stated that if the world did not act, security 
would erode and plunge the region into turmoil.124 
In less than a year, the Ebola virus had made its way through Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea leaving a path of death, economic degradation, and overburdened 
government institutions. With thousands dead and many more infected, the pandemic 
threatened the local region and beyond. The global response adequate to fight this global 
crisis required a combined effort of USG agencies, NGOs, the DOD, and additional 
resources from governments around the world. The President of the United States 
declared a “whole-of-government” response with USAID in the lead.125 The president 
ordered the DOD to set up a Joint Force Command to facilitate the response effort to help 
stop the spread of the Ebola virus and eradicate it from the region. Operation United 
Assistance officially began on 16 September 2014 as a significant part of the global 
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united response to the increasing Ebola threat. This chapter will review the humanitarian 
interaction and subsequent lessons learned during Operation United Assistance by the 
Department of Defense, the State Department, and International and Non-Governmental 
Organizations. 
A. U.S. MILITARY RESPONSE 
To initiate the U.S. military’s role in the response, U.S. Africa Command 
(USAFRICOM) sent a small force to Monrovia, Liberia, from U.S. Army Africa 
(USARAF), which is the Army Service component command (ASCC) for the region. 
Under the leadership and command of Maj. Gen. Darryl Williams, USARAF formed 
Joint Forces Command-Operation United Assistance (JFC-OUA) on 16 September 2014. 
The joint force’s mission was to support USAID and build Ebola Treatment Units 
(ETUs), diagnostics labs, and a field hospital. The JTF would also train local personnel to 
maintain and operate the new facilities.  
The JTF organized their effort into four phases: 1) Initial Entry, 2) Integration, 3) 
Support to USAID and 4) Transition/Redeployment.126 The first two phases were 
immediately complicated due to the lack of local infrastructure and a weak local 
economy. The rainy season was at its peak, roads and airfields were mostly inadequate, 
and the political situation was fragile and unstable.127 AFRICOM relied heavily in the 
early stages of the operation on its J4 team, which quickly set up an around-the-clock 
Joint Logistics and Deployment and Distribution Operations Centers (JLOC & 
DDOC).128 Daily meetings at the operations centers eventually became unclassified to 
include the wide variety of non-military actors that proved to be essential to the success 
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of the mission.129 From the very beginning, the JFC-OUA commander planned and 
worked to transition his capabilities and sustainment missions to USAID and NGOs, and 
keeping information unclassified and involving other organizations in daily coordination 
meetings was important in preparing for the transition. Prior to handing the mission over 
to the civilian agencies, USARAF handed the effort over to the 101st Airborne Division 
on 25 October 2014 to continue the construction of the ETUs and train local personnel.130 
The 101st ended its operations in support of Operation United Assistance on 27 February 
2015. 
B. STATE DEPARTMENT AND INTERAGENCY RESPONSE 
As standard practice for USG humanitarian responses, USAID took the lead for 
the U.S. government in providing support in West Africa.131 The agency immediately 
dispatched two DART teams to set up operations centers in Monrovia, Liberia, and 
Conakry, Guinea. As part of the DART package, personnel from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Public Health Service also traveled to the 
affected region and participated in the planning, administrative, and coordination 
operations.132 The DARTs became the focal point for coordination and collaboration 
activities between other U.S. agencies, host country governments, and NGOs.133 
The primary effort of USAID and the U.S. response has been to increase the 
number of ETUs and teams trained in proper burial techniques to contain the infection 
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from spreading.134 The USAID mission statement—“to partner to end extreme poverty 
and promote resilient democratic societies while advancing our security and 
prosperity”135—has extended the USAID effort beyond fighting the Ebola virus to 
minimizing the overall health, economic, and social impacts the crisis has on the 
region.136  
C. INTERNATIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 
RESPONSE 
Beginning in early 2014, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) and multiple other 
NGOs increased their focus to treat the Ebola situation. Medecins Sans Frontieres set up 
a facility near the town of Foya in April to isolate confirmed and suspected cases. 
Additional NGOs did the same in other parts of the region. Sam Worthington, President 
of InterAction,137 in remarks regarding the NGO contribution to the Ebola response said, 
“There are over 30 international NGOs operating in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea.”138 Worthington said that the work of NGOs in the affected region has been 
essential in reducing the rate of infections. In addition to running Ebola treatment units, 
many NGOs had become involved in the burial procedures, supporting over 100 burial 
groups trained in the proper burial of infected bodies to prevent others from being 
infected. The NGO community is also essential for the outreach programs designed to 
locate and inform locals directly affected by the virus.139  
Week after week, there were more new cases of infection than beds available to 
care for the sick. The situation became bleak and by late summer, the NGO community 
made a plea for more international help. With the help of WHO, the governments of 
Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia launched a response plan in August 2014 to control the 
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Ebola outbreak. Without a robust national healthcare system in place, the affected 
countries relied on NGOs and IGOs—MSF, religious groups, and WHO—to provide 
large-scale medical emergency responses.140 
D. OBSERVATIONS 
By late January 2015, the U.S. military mission was near completion and 
President Obama approved USAID and DOD to begin transitioning the operation to other 
civilian and international organizations.141 The successful coordination between USAID 
and AFRICOM was in large part due to the relationship that existed prior to the event. 
The mutual institutional understanding shared by these two organizations in the region 
was rehearsed and became a key component of the quick and effective response.142 Even 
though the military personnel deployed to West Africa were not specially trained 
humanitarian and pandemic response forces, they arrived with a solid understanding of 
their supporting role to USAID. As one report in the military response put it, the U.S. 
forces overcame their training shortfalls, “performed well, and accomplished the 
directives laid out by USAID.”143  
The previous two case studies focused on a humanitarian response to a natural 
disaster. A humanitarian response to an outbreak introduces different components and 
includes participants that may not play regular roles in the more frequent natural disaster 
relief efforts. A humanitarian response revolving around a health crisis not only requires 
responding to needs as they arise, but also planning and prevention efforts to deal with 
geographically shifting priorities as the outbreak evolves.144 Maintaining a reliable, 
accurate, and expansive communication system is essential in all disaster responses, but 
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especially important during a health crisis. Coordinating organizations must continually 
disseminate information regarding the current situation on the ground, evolving trends, 
and new practices and procedures to the entire response to prevent ineffective efforts and 
counterproductive actions.145  
Communication and tracking among the NGO community was well organized and 
efficient according to InterAction President Worthington. One important aspect of that 
communication was that InterAction operated a geocode mapping service that 
automatically uploaded tracking data directly to UN databases on projects conducted by 
various NGOs.146 The tracking service provided by InterAction helped reduce redundant 
taskings and optimized assignments to new NGOs arriving in the field.  
Several relief organizations have developed and implemented effective 
communications systems to communicate amongst themselves and other similar 
organizations, but communicating with the local population proved to be another issue. 
Engaging with the local community is crucial in a medical humanitarian response. During 
the West African Ebola response, some communities were not aware of or did not have 
confidence in the effectiveness of the ETUs popping up around the region. Since many 
locals did not have accurate information regarding the locations and functions of the 
ETUs, they came up with their own solutions for treating loved ones, and disposing of 
infected bodies, often with dangerous results. In some areas, community representatives 
reported that the normal procedure was to first administer care at home with local 
pharmaceuticals and herbal remedies. Containing the highly infectious Ebola virus is a 
difficult task, especially outside of a designated care facility and without a trained team 
of caregivers. Health experts were concerned about the abilities of locals to be effective 
in handling sick patients and infected bodies, and suggested that the mishandling of 
patients attributed to the rapidly rising numbers of infected.147 
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E. THE WAY FORWARD 
An after-action report conducted by Banyan Analytics found that, “Coordination 
for international response organizations and donor nations is important to ensure 
reconciliation of their different approaches and agendas toward a coordinated and 
focused response.”148 The overall communication and coordination that took place 
between the U.S. military, the USG, and NGOs in West Africa continued rather smoothly 
throughout the operation, but could have been more efficient during the beginning of the 
response. A possible solution that an AFRICOM spokesperson suggested is that 
synchronizing communication platforms prior to an event such as the Ebola response 
would reduce the lag time and make information flow even smoother during the initial 
phases of the operation.149 A lesson from this case shows that potential partners from the 
COCOMS, UN, USG, and NGOs need to build relationships to understand each other’s 
communicative systems and procedures as early as possible to be most effective.150 
The communication systems need to extend beyond the response organizations 
and be able to reach the local organizations in the heart of the crisis. During the initial 
phase of any operation, a primary effort needs to focus on establishing lines of 
communication with the affected population to ensure they understand the intent and 
expectations of the relief organizations. If the local population does not understand the 
locations and procedures for receiving relief, the effectiveness of the response is 
reduced.151  
Another after action report, from The Heritage Foundation, recommended a 
reassessment of the U.S. military force posture to deal with large-scale humanitarian 
situations. The study argued that posturing soldiers and supplies closer to the most 
probable disaster areas will reduce reaction and travel time to initiate a response.152 The 
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report’s authors acknowledge that this point is an obvious one, but they note that it is 
vital to ensure that the right personnel are postured appropriately.153 Many of the 
personnel responding to the Ebola response had minimal training in health related issues, 
especially at the pandemic level. All organizations that intend to respond to a future 
health related disaster, like the one in West Africa, should consider an all-force joint 

















                                                 




The first chapter of this thesis asked how the U.S. military and other humanitarian 
organizations could improve their interaction with one another during a humanitarian 
operation. The introduction examined ideas and literature on the topic from experts 
throughout the past several decades of humanitarian responses. The thesis then presented 
three case studies that have occurred within the past 15 years: Operation Unified 
Assistance in Indonesia, Operation Unified Response in Haiti, and Operation United 
Assistance in Western Africa. Each case study focused on the separate actions taken by 
the U.S. military, various U.S. government agencies, and international non-governmental 
organizations, particularly the communication and coordination systems and procedures 
each entity used to interact within and outside of its own organization. 
The first case study, Operation Unified Assistance in Indonesia, explored the 
humanitarian response following the 9.1 magnitude earthquake and resultant tsunami that 
swept across the Indian Ocean in 2004, devastating coastal areas in India, Sir Lanka, 
Thailand, and Indonesia. The disaster left 230,000 dead and millions without food, water, 
and shelter. The global response included hundreds of government and non-government 
organizations.  
The second case study, Operation Unified Response in Haiti, explored the 
humanitarian response following the devastating 7.0 earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010. 
The earthquake in Haiti destroyed thousands of building and injured or killed over 
500,000 people. The capital of Haiti, Port-au-Prince, was left in ruins leaving the local 
government powerless to adequately respond. The country made an immediate request 
for international assistance. The humanitarian response included USAID, the U.S. 
military, and hundreds of other international organizations.   
The final case study, Operation United Assistance, followed the outbreak and 
spread of the deadly Ebola virus in Western Africa and the subsequent international 
humanitarian effort. In March of 2014, doctors identified a rapidly spreading virus as 
Ebola, and within a few months, thousands were infected and dying across multiple 
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Western African nations. Fearful of spreading to more countries, President Barack 
Obama with other world leaders ordered an intervention to reverse the extensive 
outbreak. International health organizations teamed up with USAID, the DOD, and other 
IGOs and NGOs to eradicate the Ebola virus from the region.  
Highlighting some recommendations that worked, did not work, and have yet to 
be appropriately implemented, this conclusion chapter will now compare and contrast the 
historical experiences and recommendations offered by experts, particularly Dr. Chris 
Seiple, regarding pre-2000 humanitarian responses with the case studies presented in this 
thesis. The chapter will then conclude with a fresh perspective on some recommendations 
that might improve civil-military interaction within a humanitarian response in the future. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS THEN AND NOW 
Interaction between the U.S. military, the State Department, and the international 
non-governmental community will continue as long as humanitarian crises exist. The 
prevalence of natural and man-made disasters will continue to rise, and not only will the 
civil-military interaction continue to be present, its significance to mission success will 
be more important than ever as the situations grow in scale. It is the responsibility of all 
entities involved in a humanitarian response to work towards understanding each other’s 
systems and capabilities, collaborating, and making the interaction work in the field. 
Each aspect of civil-military interaction has been studied on multiple occasions by 
multitudes of experts, and the list of recommendations on how to make it more effective 
continues to grow. This section will cover some of the most significant issues—with their 
associated recommendations—including joint training, militaristic tendencies, integrated 
communications networks, and structural systems for collaboration.  
1. Joint Training 
Dr. Chris Seiple advised in his 1996 book that the collaboration between the 
military and the other players involved should take place prior to the actual humanitarian 
event. He suggested that NGOs and other response organizations would benefit if they 
could develop a way to get more involved in the interagency planning process prior to an 
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event.155 Nick Spence suggests that humanitarian response organizations, both military 
and non-military, need to come together for training with the intent to identify their 
respective capabilities and develop an agreed upon end state. With their capabilities 
identified and end state defined, the organizations can then work together to design a plan 
accounting for the strengths and weaknesses of the players involved.156  
The case studies examined in this thesis indicate that although Seiple’s 
recommendation  has been followed in some instances, humanitarian response 
organizations still do not routinely train together as much as they should. During the early 
stages of Operation Unified Assistance in Indonesia, some military participants struggled 
to grasp the intent and locations of numerous NGOs spread throughout the area.157 The 
lack of understanding and initial coordination between the military’s CCC and the UN’s 
IASC slowed early coordination and processing of the many individual assessments and 
collaboration meetings conducted during the first few days of the mission.158 The delays 
created by early misunderstandings and duplications of effort could have been avoided 
had the various organizations and associated leaders conducted scenario-based training or 
at least familiarization seminars prior to the event.  
The situation regarding joint interaction in 2010 following the earthquake in Haiti 
showed much improvement compared to the 2004 Indonesian disaster because many of 
the players in Haiti already had established working relationships prior to the crisis.159 
The UN, NGOs, and various militaries had already been coordinating various activities 
through MINUSTAH for a few years prior to 2010, which demonstrates how prior joint 
experience can drastically improve initial coordination efforts during a time-sensitive 
event.  
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One effort to bring organizations together outside of an actual event exists in the 
Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) provided by USAID.160 At this course, 
members of the military and other leading humanitarian organizations meet for a two day 
course that covers the spectrum of responsibilities, capabilities, and expectations USAID 
brings to the field. The JHOC is an effective course in providing information to military 
and civilian leaders, but it is completely voluntary and does not include hands-on training 
exercises and significant relationship building opportunities. 
The DOD has updated and published its Foreign Humanitarian Assistance manual 
to include instructions and procedures for working with U.S. government agencies and 
non-government agencies.161 The manual, however, does not include any extensive 
procedures for conducting joint exercises to prepare commands and units to interact with 
other entities.  
The UN has made significant strides to develop training and partnership programs 
to educate and integrate humanitarian leaders from all aspects of the humanitarian 
response. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) states, “The UN Training and Partnership Unit (TPU) establishes partnerships 
with various organizations around the world, which allows OCHA to deliver and sustain 
its UN-CMCoord Training Programme catering to the training needs of its beneficiaries 
within the humanitarian and military communities.”162 The TPU currently maintains a 
training schedule that includes four core training products designed to familiarize 
attendees with OCHA’s practical application of civil-military coordination principles. 
The efforts of OCHA and the effectiveness of its training products are significant 
contributors to the mutual understanding and effective interaction of all the entities 
involved in a humanitarian effort, but, like USAID’s training programs, they are 
voluntary and require significant time, travel, and funding for participants.  
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The U.S. military, USG agencies, and prominent U.S. based NGOs should make 
attendance to USAID’s JHOC, or an enhanced version of JHOC, mandatory for all 
entities that might be involved in a humanitarian response. Military units alongside 
USAID should also develop and conduct regular interaction exercises that incorporate 
various USG agencies and NGO leadership in a field and state-side coordination cell 
environment. Familiarization courses, such and JHOC, and regularly scheduled joint 
exercise will streamline interaction during an actual event, as well as reduce friction 
between military and civilian personalities forced to come together for the first time in 
the heart of a crisis.    
2. Militaristic Tendencies 
Thomas R. Mockaitis suggested that the military’s inherent focus on military 
tasks and procedures makes it an objectionable candidate to work in a humanitarian 
environment.163 His coverage of Kosovo detailed many of the issues relief organizations 
had when working with military personnel. In summary, soldiers acting like soldiers 
became an issue in the humanitarian environment. From the tactical level with soldiers 
carrying their rifles at-the-ready to the operational level with operations centers closed off 
and restricted to civilian personnel, humanitarian organizations found it difficult to work 
with the military.164  
Understanding the associated difficulties of civil-military relations, Mockaitis 
stressed a common principle that civil-military relationship building is essential for 
progress in humanitarian operations.165 To be effective, military personnel must build 
relationships with both civilian organizations participating in the response and local 
civilians affected by the humanitarian crisis. Protection measures that include 
intimidation, abuse, and excessive force limit the relationship building capabilities of 
both the military and the civilian relief personnel perceived to be associated with the 
military. Force protection is an important aspect of any operation, but in a humanitarian 
                                                 




situation, Mockaitis and others argue that positive relations with the surrounding 
populations and civilians familiar with the area will do more for security than excessive 
force protection measures.166   
The cases examined here suggest there has been progress toward achieving the 
more positive relationship that Mockaitis called for. For example, many civilian relief 
personnel during Operation Unified Response commented on the military’s preparedness 
to interact with their agencies at the tactical level.167 The frequent contact military 
personnel have had with civilian organizations and contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq 
over the past decade has increased the familiarity between soldiers and civilians during 
civil-military coordination. With the Iraq mission completed, and Afghanistan winding 
down, however, the familiar civil-military relations in the field will diminish unless the 
military and NGOs continue to find ways to frequently interact. The joint training 
exercises and courses discussed in the previous subsection will help maintain the 
familiarity and relative ease of tactical interactions in future joint operations. 
 Seiple suggested in 1996 that military commanders should remove themselves 
from their military centric and isolated control centers and take advantage of civilian 
insight by emphasizing greater importance and military participation at the CMOC or its 
equivalent.168 As military commanders act less like commanders of operations 
surrounded by military defenses and more like willing participants in a collective effort to 
save lives and do no harm, civilian entities will be more willing to serve actively 
alongside military leaders rather than as reluctant dependents of the military’s logistic 
capabilities. The CMOC or its equivalent should be established early as a neutral center 
on neutral ground with decision-makers from all parties present to facilitate rapid 
information flow and collaboration.169  During the assessment stage of the Indonesian 
response, both NGOs and the military possessed valuable assessment information that 
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would have been useful to each other if shared. Many NGOs did not relay their 
assessments with the military because neutral coordination systems were non-existent, 
and NGOs did not want to risk losing impartiality by communicating on military 
grounds.170 The lack of vital information flow delayed and duplicated many initial 
essential deliveries and support to critical areas.171   
3. Integrated Communication Networks 
Communication during a humanitarian response has always been an essential 
component of effective and efficient operations. The essential nature of communication 
increases exponentially as the scope and scale of humanitarian responses continue to 
expand. In each case study presented, the number of relief organizations and participants 
exceeded 100, not including the local population at the heart of the destruction. In most 
humanitarian circumstances, time is critical. Military and civilian humanitarian 
organizations must communicate and cooperate to avoid conducting parallel operations 
and duplicating efforts in order to reach and help as many people as possible. At the 
earliest stages of a response, the assessment conducted by military units and NGOs must 
be communicated to ensure the right equipment, supplies, and people will be delivered. 
Progress reports and developing situations must be reported throughout the response to 
operations centers to ensure the appropriate level of support to the appropriate areas 
continues. It is easy to see how communication plays an essential role at every stage of a 
humanitarian response.  
Multiple challenges exist when faced with fixing the communications issues relief 
personnel have experienced in past humanitarian responses. An obvious communication 
challenge includes the use of foreign languages, but the operational language used by the 
military also differs from the language used by civilian organizations and can cause 
difficulties and delays in communication efforts.172 Another challenge existed in Haiti 
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where the local communications structure was destroyed and inoperable. Many 
organizations relied on the military for communication needs, but they experienced 
difficulties when their communications systems were not compatible with military 
systems.173 
The operational language challenge that civilian organizations face when dealing 
with military units can be overcome by a combination of two solutions. First, civilian 
organizations should familiarize themselves with military lingo and acronyms. The 
second is for military units, especially units preparing for and engaging in humanitarian 
operations, to speak plain English without the use of common military operational 
language. Those two solutions seem almost obvious enough that they do not warrant 
space in this thesis, but the confusion and delays created from the use of military jargon 
continues to be an issue in humanitarian operations.174    
The challenge presented by incompatible communications networks has also been 
an ongoing issue experienced in most large-scale humanitarian operations to date. In 
Indonesia during Operation Unified Assistance, the military’s use of the SIPR net and 
other unique communication systems prevented other organizations from participating in 
meetings and receiving valuable information. As a result, the flawed and unreliable Asia-
Pacific Area Network (APAN) managed by PACOM became the best option for 
unclassified communication.175  
In more recent operations such as Haiti and West Africa, the need to transmit 
information at the unclassified level was more widely understood and communication 
efforts have been more effective. The next step is the creation and implementation of a 
dedicated network compatible with and shared by all organizations involved in a 
humanitarian response. Humanitarian response planners cannot predict whether or not 
local communication systems will remain operational following a disaster, therefore, a 
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portable communication system shared by response personnel is essential to ensure 
constant communication capabilities from the beginning.  
4. Structural Systems for Collaboration 
Coordination and Collaboration seem to be the buzzwords throughout 
humanitarian response planning and review. In each case study examined in this thesis, as 
well as the case studies presented by Seiple in 1996, the issue of whether or not proper 
coordination and collaboration centers existed and operated effectively found its way into 
the literature. Seiple concluded that an improved CMOC should be the coordination 
center of choice, however, in the cases examined here, each humanitarian response 
commander chose a different type of civil-military interaction.176 In Indonesia, MEF 
Commander Lt Gen Robert Blackman set up the Combined Coordination Center (CCC) 
at his JTF HQ, while in Haiti the military utilized a Humanitarian Assistance 
Coordination Center (HACC) with operations split between the OFDA team at the U.S. 
embassy and the OCHA team at the UN Logistics Base.177  
In each circumstance, the established center helped achieve the commander’s end 
state, but valuable time was used to determine what center to use and then familiarize the 
various organizations with its operations. If the major players coming together in a 
humanitarian operation already had an established plan for a coordination center, they 
could immediately begin operations rather than reinventing the wheel.   
The U.S. government agencies participating in humanitarian responses often have 
their own coordination centers that operate parallel to the military’s coordination center. 
Normally, USAID will send a disaster assistance response team (DART) to supplement 
UN, NGO, and military coordination efforts to facilitate a smooth flow of support from 
U.S. resources into the effort. In Haiti, however, in addition to the standard response 
management team in Washington and a DART on site, USAID set up additional 
coordination offices including a state-side interagency task force, and the Office of the 
Response Coordinator (ORC) in Haiti. The coordination efforts continued to grow in 
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quantity when FEMA also participated by activating a National Response Coordination 
Center (NRCC).178  
The coordination centers listed in the previous two paragraphs are only a few of 
the many coordination systems that operate parallel to many others in disaster situations, 
including host nation coordination cells, inter-NGO coordinating offices, and additional 
international coordination designs of all shapes and sizes. The amount of delay and 
confusion created during the numerous coordination meetings at the numerous 
coordination centers are incalculable, but have proven to be a continuing hindrance to fast 
and efficient humanitarian action.  
Over the past decade, permanent coordinating structures have been designed and 
operated in an attempt to maximize coordination while minimizing delay. The UN cluster 
system is a good example of the continuing efforts in the humanitarian community to 
streamline response coordination. The UN cluster system, consisting of 11 separate 
clusters or functional areas of coordination, helps speed communication and decision-
making by filtering the massive amounts of information into specific areas of focus, but 
faces challenges as needs and responsibilities overlap when coordination does not.179  
It is not clear how a smooth and efficient coordination system should be designed, 
but it is clear that there should not be so many coordination centers, offices, and cells 
operating parallel to one another in a crisis situation. The design of the ultimate 
coordination center may not be as important as an agreement between all the entities 
involved in a humanitarian response to limit the number of coordination centers in 
operation by combining forces.   
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B. THE WAY FORWARD 
 The four overarching issues presented in this conclusion span the realm of 
components that require military/USG/NGO interaction in a humanitarian operation. The 
issues exist during planning and preparation as well as during execution and 
coordination. Researchers and planners have dedicated considerable effort dissecting 
each issue, and even components within each issue, to develop logical and sound 
recommendations to improve interaction. On occasions, new methods and innovations 
have worked with a degree of success in some areas, such as the UN cluster system in 
Haiti and the APAN in Indonesia, but have failed to make reliable progress in the overall 
effort to improve humanitarian interaction. Perhaps the reason for the slow progress is the 
isolation of each issue from the others when developing recommendations on how to 
improve that individual area of concern. A grander solution that considers each phase of 
the humanitarian operation and includes all the entities that might be involved may be 
needed to improve humanitarian interaction.  
 The way forward is to remind ourselves of a similar vision that led to the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act180 and implement a big picture solution.181 When a humanitarian 
crisis arises, the U.S. Government cannot send USAID, the U.S. military, the Department 
of State, and various other organizations to respond and expect them to automatically 
work harmoniously together. The organizations expected to travel across the world within 
a small window of time to an area recently devastated by a natural disaster must be 
completely familiar and integrated with each other if they are to be expected to offer 
immediate, effective, and efficient humanitarian assistance. Even experienced 
quarterbacks, receivers, and linemen in American football would not fare well without 
extensive prior coordination against a team of mediocre players organized and ready to 
play as a team. The USG humanitarian response team must plan, prepare, and practice 
together before showing up in the field if they are going to be successful. 
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 A dedicated unit designed to immediately respond and lead the USG’s 
humanitarian response should be created. Similar to the U.S. Army’s Global Response 
Force (GRF), a special humanitarian response force should stand ready to deploy 
anywhere in the world, with an intimate humanitarian focus, within 18 hours. The 
humanitarian response unit will deploy ahead of other military and USG entities with the 
capabilities and expertise to conduct extensive assessments, set up the response 
coordination center, perform life-saving activities, and receive incoming military and 
civilian response commodities and personnel. This unit should be comprised of leaders 
and representatives from all pertinent agencies and organizations along with the resources 
and funding necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to it.  
 An interagency humanitarian response unit comprised of DOD, USAID, DOS, 
and even NGO personnel can design a system and structure that will take into account the 
four primary issues previously discussed. The unit will be able to design and conduct 
joint training activities that integrate additional forces and personnel from each agency 
depending on the scale of the emergency. A delay resulting from the time spent 
familiarizing one another with each agency’s particular structure and intent at the 
beginning of a response will be eliminated.  
 Soldiers and civilians will benefit through the constant interaction with each other 
within the unit, which will reduce the issues arising from institutional differences 
discussed in the militaristic tendencies subsection.  
 The interagency humanitarian unit will be required to develop a portable and 
integrated communication network that is compatible within its own ranks, as well as 
each individual agency. The single communications system used by this humanitarian 
unit may serve as a model for other international humanitarian organizations to emulate, 
ensuring integrated and reliable communications will exist anywhere around the world 
among all entities involved.  
 The DOD, USAID, DOS, and other major players in a humanitarian response all 
belonging to a single unit will reduce the number and variations of coordination systems 
and centers. With the majority of USG coordination occurring in one place, the time 
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spent in meetings and on coordinating activities will be drastically reduced. As the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act pushed the U.S. military to think, train, and act jointly, we need a 
similar act of legislation today that would push the U.S. interagency community to think 
about its response to humanitarian crises in the same way.  
 Francis Kofi Abiew admonished that the “effectiveness of contemporary peace 
operations will depend on the collaboration of military and civilian actors.”182 Civilian 
and military organizations entering a humanitarian crisis, even with the best intentions, 
will continue to experience unnecessary challenges and delays unless they can join forces 
to plan, prepare for, and execute the humanitarian response together as one.     
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